Mental Competency in Immigration Courts: Presumption, Safeguards, and Due Process Violations by Lourdel, Margot
City University of New York Law Review 
Volume 21 Issue 2 
Fall 2018 
Mental Competency in Immigration Courts: Presumption, 
Safeguards, and Due Process Violations 
Margot Lourdel 
Pu-Folkes Law Group, margot@pufolkeslaw.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Margot Lourdel, Mental Competency in Immigration Courts: Presumption, Safeguards, and Due Process 
Violations, 21 CUNY L. Rev. 23 (2018). 
Available at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/9 
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more 
information please contact cunylr@law.cuny.edu. 
Mental Competency in Immigration Courts: Presumption, Safeguards, and Due 
Process Violations 
Acknowledgements 
The author would like to thank Alexia Schapira, Douglas Cox, Mackenzie Lew, Princess Masilungan, and 
the CUNY Law Review staff, all Of Whom Made This Article Possible. 
This article is available in City University of New York Law Review: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/9 
 
23 
CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM 
 
November 27, 2018 
 
Recommended citation: 
Margot Lourdel, Mental Competency in Immigration Courts: Presump-




MENTAL COMPETENCY IN IMMIGRATION 
COURTS: PRESUMPTION, SAFEGUARDS, AND 
DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS 
Margot Lourdel† 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN IMMIGRATION COURT HAVE 
HISTORICALLY BEEN LOWER THAN IN THE CRIMINAL LAW CONTEXT. THIS 
PAPER EXPLORES HOW THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IS APPLIED TO 
NONCITIZENS, RECENT ATTEMPTS AT PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF 
NONCITIZENS WITH MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, 
AND THE URGENT NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK IN 
IMMIGRATION COURT TO EFFECTIVELY PROTECT THESE RIGHTS. 
INTRODUCTION 
At a time when immigrants’ rights are constantly under attack, this 
article highlights how the current deportation machine that is the U.S. im-
migration system fails to provide due process to people with mental and 
cognitive issues. Since 2011, federal regulations and the courts have at-
tempted to create a framework to protect the rights of immigrants with 
mental health issues. This framework — requiring judges to engage in 
competency evaluations and respondents to fight for a fair process on their 
 
 †  Margot Lourdel is a member of the Class of 2018 at CUNY School of Law. During law 
school, she has represented immigrants and low-wage workers with Make the Road New York 
and CUNY Law’s Workers’ Rights Clinic. This article draws on her experience representing 
a Togolese national who was diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. Her client was granted 
asylum on February 26, 2018. The author would like to thank Alexia Schapira, Douglas Cox, 
Mackenzie Lew, Princess Masilungan, and the CUNY Law Review staff, all Of Whom Made 
This Article Possible. 
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own — fails to provide respondents with a fair opportunity to present their 
case by not providing them with free legal representation, by asking im-
migration judges and lawyers to make determinations about respondents’ 
mental health, and often by simply allowing removal proceedings to go 
forward. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS GENERALLY APPLY TO NONCITIZENS, 
BUT NONCITIZENS STILL HAVE TO FIGHT FOR DUE PROCESS IN 
IMMIGRATION COURT 
The government is often reluctant to apply the Constitution to noncit-
izens. However, in 1886, the Supreme Court recognized that noncitizens 
may be protected by the Constitution when it applied the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to Chinese nationals who were dis-
criminated against by unequal enforcement of a San Francisco ordinance 
that required a license to operate a laundry in the city. The Court held that 
the racially discriminatory application of a racially neutral statute violates 
the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of national origin.1 
While the government sometimes argues that noncitizens are entitled 
to diminished due process, often in the name of “national security,”2 the 
Supreme Court held in 1953 that the Due Process Clause does not 
“acknowledge[] any distinction between citizens and resident aliens.”3 In 
1976, the Court established a balancing test for determining what process 
is due for any administrative action.4 This test balances the individual’s 
interest against the government’s interest while considering whether the 
procedure under challenge is likely to produce erroneous results.5 A court 
does not consider nationality. In 1982, the Court held that this balancing 
also governs what process is due in immigration proceedings.6 
 
 1 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 2 See, e.g., Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 2121 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 21 (2000) 
(statement of Larry R. Parkinson, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigations) (arguing 
that foreign nationals are entitled to diminished due process protection); Elisabeth Bumiller & 
Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials Defend Military Tribunals for Terrorist 
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2001), https://perma.cc/3SPZ-467X; see also Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (rejecting the government’s argument that foreign nationals were 
not protected by the Constitution). 
 3 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 
326 U.S. 135 (1945)) (holding that as a legal resident noncitizen, respondent was protected by 
the Fifth Amendment and could not be detained without being informed of the charges against 
him and given a hearing sufficient to satisfy due process requirements). 
 4 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
 5 Id. at 348. 
 6 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). 
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Recently, the Court recognized that noncitizens could be awarded 
the protection of the Constitution when it acknowledged that a noncitizen 
has a liberty interest at least strong enough to raise the question of whether 
the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially per-
manent.7 The Court found that the power of the political branches over 
immigration “is subject to important constitutional limitations.”8 
Still, due process rights for noncitizens are challenged to this day. In 
2003, the Supreme Court in Demore v. Kim upheld a 1996 statute impos-
ing mandatory detention on foreign nationals charged with deportation 
for having committed certain crimes, by relying on the fact that the de-
fendant was not a U.S. citizen.9 There, the Court denied the plaintiff any 
individualized assessment of the need for detention by precisely invoking 
that “Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if ap-
plied to citizens.”10 
In immigration proceedings, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
removal proceedings, while not subject to the full range of constitutional 
protections, must conform to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.11 Regulations issued in 1997 reflect Congress’ intent to provide a 
fair hearing to respondents in immigration court, such as 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.10(a)(4), requiring immigration judges (“IJs”) to inform respond-
ents that they have a reasonable opportunity to present, examine, and ob-
ject to evidence.12 Yet there is no recognized right to counsel for nonciti-
zens in immigration court under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. The Immigration and Nationality Act only provides that respond-
ents shall have the privilege to be represented at no cost to the govern-
ment.13 
 
 7 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (holding that the government could 
not hold noncitizen in indefinite detention if the government was unable to remove the noncit-
izen). 
 8 Id. at 695 (citing I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding, 
inter alia, that detainees at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law and of the Geneva 
Conventions). 
 9 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003). 
 10 Id. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). 
 11 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306-07 (1993). 
 12 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2018). 
 13 INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2018). 
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II.  SAFEGUARDS IN IMMIGRATION COURT: IN THEORY AND AS APPLIED 
A. Establishing “Incompetency” 
While persons who are deemed incompetent may not be tried in a 
criminal prosecution,14 they may be subject to removal proceedings.15 A 
respondent in immigration proceedings is presumed competent, and the 
respondent bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.16 An inquiry 
into a respondent’s competency is triggered by the presence of “indicia of 
incompetency,” regardless of when they arise in the course of the pro-
ceedings.17 An IJ’s finding of mental incompetency is a legal determina-
tion. It is not a diagnosis and is not made by a mental health professional, 
although the input of a mental health professional may aid an IJ in making 
this determination.18 If a respondent is found incompetent, the IJ must 
determine “appropriate safeguards” to the respondent’s situation to ensure 
that the rights and privileges of the respondent are protected during re-
moval proceedings. IJs must also articulate rationale for decisions regard-
ing competency issues on the record, regardless of their ultimate determi-
nation, the purpose of which is to provide the respondent with a developed 
record in case they wish to appeal an unfavorable decision to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).19 Yet, absent indicia of mental incom-
petency, an IJ is under no obligation to analyze respondent’s compe-
tency.20 
Indicia of mental incompetency include a broad range of observa-
tions and evidence such as mental health assessments, medical reports or 
assessments from past medical treatment, or criminal proceedings and tes-
timony from medical health professionals. The record may also contain 
evidence such as reports or letters from teachers, social workers, or coun-
selors; evidence of participation in programs for people with mental ill-
ness; evidence of applications for disability benefits; and affidavits or tes-
timony from family members or friends.21 Additionally, the IJ or the 
parties may help determine competency through direct observation of cer-
tain behaviors, such as the inability to understand and appropriately re-
spond to questions, the inability to stay on topic, or a great deal of distrac-
tion.22 
 
 14 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). 
 15 Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 16 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (B.I.A. 2011). 
 17 Id. at 480. 
 18 Id. at 480-81. 
 19 Id. at 484. 
 20 Id. at 477. 
 21 Id. at 479-80. 
 22 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479. 
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Once a judge finds indicia of mental incompetency, the IJ must then 
make a determination of whether the respondent is competent to proceed 
or not. The test devised in Matter of M-A-M- for determining whether a 
noncitizen is competent to participate in immigration proceedings is 
whether they: (1) have a rational and factual understanding of the nature 
and object of the proceedings; (2) can consult with the attorney or repre-
sentative, if there is one; and (3) have a reasonable opportunity to examine 
and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.23 
This test is an imprecise standard. The BIA has recognized that the 
approach taken in each case will vary based on the circumstances of the 
case.24 The BIA has suggested that the IJ may modify the questions posed 
to the respondent to make them very simple and direct, ask questions 
about where the hearing is taking place, the nature of the proceedings, the 
respondent’s state of mind, whether he or she currently takes or has taken 
medication to treat a mental illness, and what the purpose and effects of 
that medication are. Another measure available to IJs is a mental compe-
tency evaluation.25 
The requirement that respondents submit indicia of incompetency 
such as medical records and therefore be able to demonstrate their own 
inability to understand their own competency issues places a heavy bur-
den on respondents, especially for those who appear pro se. Under this 
requirement, pro se respondents have, in theory, the insight sufficient in 
their condition and the resources available to reach out to medical profes-
sionals to obtain documentation of their condition. Judges must conduct 
a competency hearing if a respondent demonstrates behaviors by the re-
spondent, such as the inability to understand and respond to questions, the 
inability to stay on topic, or a high level of distraction in court.26 Yet, the 
reliance on (1) an IJ to be able to notice such symptoms and (2) visible 
symptoms of mental illness leaves out an array of mental health issues 
that may still affect the respondent’s defense and rights. 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 480. 
 25 Id. at 481; see also Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 915 (A.G. 2006) (noting that 
at the immigration judge’s request, DHS arranged for a psychiatric evaluation of a detained 
noncitizen, which led the psychiatrist to conclude that the noncitizen understood the proceed-
ings and wanted to proceed with the hearing). 
 26 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479. 
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III.  EXISTING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IN 
IMMIGRATION COURT FOR RESPONDENTS WITH MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES 
Regulatory safeguards include that an IJ must not accept an admis-
sion of removability from an unrepresented respondent who is incompe-
tent and is not accompanied by an attorney or legal representative, a near 
relative, legal guardian, or friend.27 When it is impracticable for the re-
spondent to be present at the hearing because of mental incompetency, 
the attorney, legal representative, legal guardian, near relative, or friend 
who was served with a copy of the notice to appear must be permitted to 
appear on behalf of the respondent.28 
Congress has enacted additional protections in immigration proceed-
ings for noncitizens with mental health issues. INA § 240(b) requires that 
safeguards be implemented to protect the “rights and privileges” of a men-
tally incompetent respondent.29 However, the ultimate determination of 
which safeguards to implement and whether they are adequate to ensure 
the fairness of proceedings is at the courts’ discretion.30 
A. Safeguards Found in Case Law 
Federal regulations do not identify specific safeguards to be applied 
nor do they limit the alternatives available to ensure the procedural fair-
ness of the hearing.31 An IJ’s identification of the relevant or available 
safeguards in a given case may involve fact-finding based on evidence in 
the record or the IJ’s observations.32 
The most common safeguard implemented by the IJ and consistently 
found to be adequate on review by the BIA is legal representation. In Mat-
ter of M-J-K, the Board held that the proper safeguard could be legal rep-
resentation.33 The participation of counsel would increase the likelihood 
of finding a means to proceed fairly, despite the respondent’s refusal to 
appear in court since counsel could interact with the respondent, com-
municate with family, caregivers, and witnesses, or take other actions 
such as presenting legal arguments regarding removability and eligibility 
for relief from removal that are not dependent on the ability to communi-
cate with the respondent. 
 
 27 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2018). 
 28 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4 (2018); see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii) (2018). 
 29 INA § 240(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2018). 
 30 See Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that the Board may 
weigh the facts underlying an IJ’s discretionary determination de novo). 
 31 See Matter of M-J-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 773, 775 (B.I.A. 2016) (finding that IJ has dis-
cretion to select and implement safeguards). 
 32 Id. at 776. 
 33 Id. at 777. 
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Another safeguard is the waiver of a respondent’s presence if they 
are represented by an attorney, a legal representative, a near relative, legal 
guardian, or friend.34 Because a major part of establishing one’s eligibility 
for asylum is based on the respondent’s credibility when testifying,35 
waiving the respondent’s presence can actually protect them from contra-
dicting themselves and hurting their case. Such a safeguard is of course 
dependent on the respondent being represented by counsel to advocate on 
their behalf.36 Other safeguards available to the IJ may include refusal to 
accept an admission of removability from an unrepresented respondent; 
identification and appearance of a family member or close friend who can 
assist the respondent and provide the court with information; docketing 
or managing the case to facilitate the respondent’s ability to obtain legal 
representation and/or medical treatment in an effort to restore compe-
tency; participation of a guardian in the proceedings; continuance of the 
case for good cause shown; closing the hearing to the public; actively aid-
ing in the development of the record, including the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses; and reserving appeal rights for the respond-
ent.37 
Finally, some safeguards have been established based on the specific 
relief requested, such as asylum. Where a mental illness may be affecting 
the reliability of an individual’s testimony, as a safeguard, the IJ may ac-
cept their fear of harm as subjectively genuine based on the individual’s 
perception of events, even if the testimony contained inconsistencies, im-
plausibility, inaccuracy of details, inappropriate behavior, or non-respon-
siveness. The IJ may decide to accept the respondent’s fear as genuine 
and focus on objective evidence.38 In other words, the IJ can choose to 
accept that the individual believes what they have stated, even though this 
account may not be believable to others. The IJ may then concentrate on 
whether the respondent can satisfy their burden of proof,39 based on the 
 
 34 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(a) (2018). 
 35 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2018). 
 36 The author is aware that representing respondents with mental illness raises serious 
ethical questions. For initial guidance on how to navigate such a complex attorney-client re-
lationship, see Rule 1.14 of the American Bar Association’s model rules of professional con-
duct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2014). 
 37 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 483 (B.I.A. 2011). 
 38 Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A. 2015) (holding that the IJ should, 
as a safeguard, generally accept that the applicant believes what he has presented, even though 
his account may not be believable to others or otherwise sufficient to support the claim, and 
that the IJ should then focus on whether the applicant can meet his burden of proof based on 
the objective evidence of record and other relevant issues). 
 39 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2018) (requiring that the applicant for asylum prove that he or 
she is a refugee as defined in section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
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objective evidence of record,40 including evidence such as their back-
ground or country conditions (evidence routinely included by practition-
ers in an asylum application to support an asylum seeker’s claim that it 
has become a de facto requirement),41 to assist in adjudicating an appli-
cation for relief. 
The IJ has discretion to require corroborating evidence “unless the 
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the 
evidence.”42 Because the respondent’s mental impairments may make lo-
cating and providing the corroborating evidence that an IJ requests diffi-
cult or impossible, the defense attorney could argue on the record that the 
respondent cannot reasonably obtain the evidence because of their mental 
health condition.43 Since the requirement is discretionary, if the IJ finds 
that a respondent cannot reasonably provide objective evidence, the IJ 
may go forward and accept the defense without corroborating evidence. 
B. Limitations of Safeguards 
Existing safeguards fail to protect noncitizens’ due process rights in 
removal proceedings. IJs have admitted that removal proceedings are sim-
ilar to trying “death penalty cases” in “traffic court.”44 Because immigra-
tion removal proceedings have long been characterized as civil, rather 
than criminal in nature, respondents are allotted less protections.45 
 
 40 See Matter of M-J-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 773, 777 (B.I.A. 2016) (finding that counsel 
could provide relevant objective documentation, such as background or country conditions 
evidence, to assist in adjudicating an application for relief). 
 41 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(iii)–(iv) (2018) (requiring that all evidence regarding condi-
tions and human rights violations in country of removal shall be considered by the IJ). 
 42 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2018). 
 43 See Vera-Villegas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 330 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that petitioner who was homeless and had a mental illness was held to an 
unreasonable standard of having to provide evidence to corroborate credible testimony estab-
lishing his eligibility for relief from removal). 
 44 Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 55 (2010) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, Pres-
ident, National Association of Immigration Judges). 
 45 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of deporta-
tion is not a punishment for crime.”); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (holding that removal is not punishment); Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceed-
ing is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an 
unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a crime.”); 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, however severe its con-
sequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”). 
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First, access to an attorney is extremely limited in immigration pro-
ceedings.46 Pursuant to statute, individuals in immigration cases are enti-
tled to representation by an attorney if they can afford one, but indigent 
people do not have a right to counsel at the government’s expense, unlike 
criminal defendants.47 In Fiscal Year 2016, only 61% of respondents in 
immigration court were represented.48 While a successful immigration 
case in 2011 in the Ninth Circuit moved one step closer to a universal 
right to counsel in immigration cases by establishing such a right for in-
dividuals with mental disabilities,49 this is only applicable to the people 
who are or have been detained in the states of Washington, California, 
Alaska, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, and Oregon. Respondents 
with mental health issues who were not detained in these states will be 
left without representation in the preliminary stages of their case and re-
quired to proceed pro se until they can prove safeguards are warranted in 
their case. 
Second, mental competency law requires defense attorneys and 
judges to play the roles of mental health experts, something they are not 
necessarily equipped to do. The absence of mental health experts’ opinion 
and evaluations in immigration court further contributes to an environ-
ment that is not created to protect respondent’s due process rights. Judges 
are solely responsible for evaluating a respondent’s mental competency. 
The standard created by Matter of M-A-M- requires the judge to evaluate 
whether the respondent has a “rational and factual understanding of the 
nature and object of the proceedings.”50 This standard is vague and open 
to the interpretation and discretion of judges who may not have gone 
through trainings on mental health issues. Further, courts have been strict 
in applying the requirement that defense attorneys raise the competency 
 
 46 See Matter of Vidal Sanchez, 2006 WL 2008263, at *2 (B.I.A. May 24, 2006) (“The 
respondent was represented at the healing; therefore, his rights were adequately protected.”); 
Matter of H-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 358, 358 (B.I.A. 1954) (holding that the requirements of a fair 
hearing had not been violated in deportation proceedings involving an alien of unsound mind, 
where notice of hearing has been served on the alien and his wife, arrangements were made to 
protect alien’s interests by having a doctor in attendance at the hearing, and the alien was 
represented by legal counsel who was given the privilege of introducing evidence and cross-
examining witnesses). 
 47 INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2018). 
 48 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016 STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK F1, fig.10 (2017), https://perma.cc/NDT4-WSMC. 
 49 Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding under 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act that detained respondents with serious mental disabilities 
were entitled to “Qualified Representatives” as a necessary accommodation in immigration 
proceedings). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to reach the constitu-
tional issue of whether appointment of legal counsel was necessary under the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause to ensure that the hearing was fundamentally fair. 
 50 Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 474 (B.I.A. 2011). 
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issue on the record and early in the proceedings, therefore putting a great 
amount of responsibility on the advocate who may not be equipped to 
identify their client’s mental health problems.51 Requiring counsel to raise 
the competency issue on the record relies on the presumption that the re-
spondent is represented. However, we know that many respondents face 
removal proceedings without legal representation. If respondents are 
lucky enough to have one, their attorney can accurately present their cli-
ent’s mental health issues to the court. 
Third, mental incompetence does not warrant termination of re-
spondent’s case. The BIA has held that removal proceedings may go for-
ward against respondents with mental health issues.52 In Matter of M-A-
M-, the Board only lists administrative closure as a possible safeguard. 
While administrative closure — removing the case from the docket tem-
porarily — can be a positive outcome for some respondents who have no 
other type of relief available to them, it does not provide a permanent visa 
or authorization to stay in the country and leaves a respondent vulnerable 
because their case can be reopened at any moment. The Executive Office 
for Immigration Review’s (EOIR) Immigration Judge Benchbook, a re-
source created by EOIR to provide substantive and procedural guidance 
for immigration judges, does offer that termination can be appropriate for 
those noncitizens found to be mentally incompetent and for whom no 
other safeguards are sufficient.53 However, the EOIR Benchbook is not 
binding legal authority and the Board has yet to issue a precedential deci-
sion upholding a case where proceedings were terminated based on the 
theory that the respondent’s incompetency made the proceedings impos-
sible to proceed fairly, in spite of safeguards. 
 
 51 See, e.g., Muñoz-Monsalve v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that 
immigration judge’s failure to sua sponte order a competency evaluation of a represented 
noncitizen did not violate the noncitizen’s due process rights as it is advocate’s role to broach 
issue of mental competence as the noncitizen’s incompetence was not evident from record of 
hearing); see also Matter of James, 2009 WL 2171712, at *2 (B.I.A. June 26, 2009) (“In this 
instance, however, the respondent’s counsel failed to request that an evaluation of the respond-
ent’s competency be undertaken. The failure to raise the competency issue in a timely manner 
renders an ensuing appellate claim of error on this basis particularly weak.”). 
 52 See Sanchez-Salvador v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 92-70828, 1994 WL 
441755, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 1994) (“Lack of competency, however, does not prevent a 
judge from determining either deportability or whether to grant relief.”); see also Matter of 
James, 2009 WL 2171712, at *2 (B.I.A. June 26, 2009) (“Moreover, contrary to the substan-
tive due process protection from trial and conviction to which a mentally incompetent criminal 
defendant is entitled, removal proceedings may go forward against incompetent aliens.”). 
 53 See Immigration Judge Benchbook, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://perma.cc/9H2L-
MATW (last updated Aug. 8, 2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
In recent years, immigration law has seen the development of case 
law and agency guidelines purporting to protect the due process rights of 
respondents with mental health issues in removal proceedings. Although 
the Constitution applies to all, citizens and noncitizens alike, the govern-
ment has argued that noncitizens are entitled to a lower due process stand-
ard. The BIA, in Matter of M-A-M-, established that the due process rights 
of noncitizens with mental health issues can be protected through a com-
petency hearing and with the implementation of suggested safeguards de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. Although the move towards recognizing 
that mental health issues can affect one’s defense in immigration court is 
important and needed, a lot remains to be done, at least to guarantee that 
the due process rights of noncitizens in removal proceedings are pro-
tected. 
First, the due process rights of respondents with mental health issues 
cannot be properly safeguarded until the right to counsel is afforded to all. 
Second, even if the presence of an attorney is crucial to the defense of a 
respondent with mental health issues, the emphasis on the roles of the 
defense attorney and the judge in evaluating a respondent’s mental health 
forces judges and immigration law practitioners to take on a role that they 
are not equipped to play. It is necessary to introduce the opinions and 
mandatory evaluations of mental health experts’ opinions in immigration 
court to adequately address respondents’ needs. Finally, termination 
based on mental incompetency must be codified or issued to ensure that 
removal proceedings do not continue against respondents whose mental 
health render a hearing fundamentally unfair and run afoul of due process 
rights. 
 
